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Abstract 
Although Theory of Mind (ToM) is thought to be impaired in Alzheimer Disease (AD), it remains 
unclear whether this impairment is linked to the level of task complexity, the heterogeneity of 
studied patients, or the implication of executive dysfunctions. To elucidate this point, forty-two AD 
patients, divided into 2 subgroups [moderate AD patients (n = 19) and early AD patients (n = 23)], 
and 23 matched healthy older subjects were enrolled. All participants were given (1) a false-belief 
task (cognitive ToM), (2) a revised version of the ‘‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’’ test (affective 
ToM), and (3) a composite task designed to assess ToM abilities with minimal cognitive demands. 
Participants were also given executive tasks assessing inhibition, shifting, and up-dating processes. 
We observed a significant impairment of cognitive and composite ToM abilities in early AD 
patients compared with moderate AD patients. There was no impairment of affective ToM. 
Stepwise regression revealed that measures of global efficiency and executive functions were the 
best predictors of progressive decay of ToM scores. These results indicate that cognitive aspects of 
ToM are more sensitive to AD progression than affective tasks. They also show that ToM abilities 
are more affected by dementia severity more than by task complexity. One explanation of our 
results is the presence of compensatory mechanisms (social reserve) in AD.  
 
Keywords: Social cognition; Alzheimer’s Disease; Theory of Mind; Executive Functions, 
Compensatory mechanisms; Social reserve. 
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Introduction 
Nowadays, researches in social cognition focus on a key aspect of the social functioning, 
called Theory of Mind (ToM), which involves the ability to understand, predict, and infer other's 
mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, and feelings (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). 
Current cognitive conceptions of ToM suggest distinguishing between ‘‘cognitive’’ and 
‘‘affective’’ components of ToM (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). The “Cognitive ToM”, 
or “Cold” mentalizing, corresponds to inferences based on others’ knowledge or beliefs, without 
any personal or emotional involvement. The “Affective ToM”, or “hot” aspect of ToM, implies 
inferences about the emotional states of others (feelings, emotions) on the basis and the 
comprehension of our own emotions (Brothers & Ring, 1992; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2003; Coricelli, 2005). 
Few studies investigated the effects of neurological diseases on ToM subcomponents, 
especially in patients with dementia. An impaired ToM ability was described in neurodegenerative 
pathologies, in particular those involving the orbitofrontal and cingulate regions (frontotemporal 
dementia, FTD: see for example Eslinger et al., 2007; Torralva, Roca, Gleichgerrcht, Bekinschtein, 
& Manes, 2009; Bertoux, Volle, de Souza, Funkiewiez, Dubois, & Habert, 2014)  
 The results of these works suggest that ToM is significantly impaired in FTD. In fact, a 
recent meta-analysis (Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014) suggested the implication 
of the medial prefrontal cortex and the temporal parietal junction in explicit interpretation of others’ 
mental states. As these regions appeared to be harshly damaged in FTD (see Adenzato, Cavallo, & 
Enrici, 2010), meta-analytic reviews of ToM in FTD found a severe, global, and primary deficit in 
mentalizing ability in this disease (Schurz et al., 2014; Henry, Philips, & von Hippel, 2014). The 
comparison of ToM abilities in FTD and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (Bora, Walterfang, and 
Velakoulis, 2015) confirmed that the evaluation of ToM abilities allows distinguishing between 
both disorders. In FTD, ToM deficit concerned both cold and hot aspects, and was especially 
marked for complex aspects of ToM such as recognition of Faux Pas and sarcasms. These primary 
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dysfunctions of ToM seem to be more severe than general cognitive deficits in FTD, and are present 
early in the course of the disease, unlike ToM impairment in AD.  
ToM evaluation in AD is underdeveloped with respect to FTD. Obvious lesions were 
demonstrated in the orbitofrontal regions (Van Hosen, Parvizi, and Chu, 2000) so it was suggested 
that ToM deficits may also be present in AD patients, responsible for patients’ difficulties in 
making and using appropriately mental state inferences in social interactions (Hodges, 2013). 
However, few studies were conducted in these patients, and their results remain controversial.  
Concerning cognitive ToM abilities, available descriptions in AD suggested that there was 
no specific deficit in cold mentalizing. Indeed, patients with AD were able to attribute first-order 
False Beliefs (FB1: Gregory et al., 2002; Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Black, 2009). By contrast, 
AD patients showed difficulties to infer second-order FB (FB2: Cuerva, Sabe, Kuzis, Tiberti, 
Dorrego, & Starkstein, 2001; Gregory et al., 2002). Based on available literature, it was assumed 
that AD patients performed worse than control subjects on ToM tasks because of the important 
cognitive demands of classical ToM tasks (Shany-Ur et al., 2012; Kemp, Després, Sellal & Dufour, 
2012; Poletti, Enrici, & Adenzato, 2012). Thus, the success on 2nd order FB tasks depends on many 
cognitive abilities such as verbal comprehension or naming (Cuerva et al., 2001), abstract thinking 
(Zaitchik, Koff, Brownell, Winner, & Albert, 2004; 2006), and working memory (Gregory et al., 
2002). It is notwithstanding to note that these abilities are usually impaired in AD patients.  
As far as affective ToM is concerned, prior studies suggested that AD patients were quite 
efficient to perform affective tasks. Gregory et al. (2002) reported that AD patients only failed the 
memory and comprehension questions of the Faux Pas test (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). 
In addition, they performed the Reading Mind in the Eyes test (RME; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) as adequately as healthy controls (Gregory et al., 2002; Modinos, 
Obiols, Pousa, & Vicens, 2009). These results are consistent with those found by Zaitchik et al. 
(2006). AD patients showed difficulties to make emotional inferences only when complex cognitive 
demands were required.  
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Note however, that recent studies displayed a number of converging lines of evidence 
questioning these consensuses. In fact, studies conducted on cold aspects of ToM by Laisney, Bon, 
Guiziou, Daluzeau, Eustache, and Desgranges (2013) or by Freedman, Binns, Black, Murphy, and 
Stuss (2013) revealed significant deficits on FB1 tasks in AD patients.  
In their study, Laisney et al. (2013) reported a significant group effect (16 AD versus 15 
matched controls) and a significant order effect (FB1 versus FB2), suggesting impaired ToM ability 
in AD patients for all FB situations. AD patients showed poor performances on FB1 order 
inferences without any comprehension or memory difficulties. Correlation with global cognitive 
functioning was also noted, indicating that FB1 inference difficulties increased as the disease 
progresses. According to these authors, the heterogeneity of included patients may explain 
controversial results between their study and past findings reporting spared FB1 functioning in early 
AD patients. 
Thanks to an original methodology, Freedman et al. (2013) confirmed the existence of 
specific deficit in FB1 tasks in AD. These authors compared their group of AD patients with a 
group of patients suffering from behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) and with a 
group of healthy subjects. Impairments were found for the FB1 and FB2 stories in both clinical 
groups. These findings challenge the consensus that mentalizing ability on FB tasks is spared in 
AD.  
Regarding affective ToM, Laisney et al. (2013) reported a significant effect of AD on a 
revised version of the RME test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). This impairment was correlated with a 
global cognitive functioning score. Such findings are on line with the assumption that difficulties on 
both affective and cognitive ToM are related to disease severity.  
Nonetheless, Castelli et al. (2011) proposed another explanation to interpret controversial 
data. They suggested that decay of ToM reasoning increased according to task complexity. In fact, 
these authors submitted 16 AD patients and 16 matched controls to a ToM battery including ToM 
precursor’s tasks, FB1 and FB2 tests, the RME test, and a strange stories task. Results showed 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
eb
ras
ka
, L
inc
oln
] a
t 0
0:5
0 0
3 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Theory of Mind and social reserve    Social Neuroscience   Page 6 of 37 
faulty ToM abilities in complex tasks while the basic ones were still functional. These findings 
support the assumption of “progressive decay of ToM abilities in AD patients starting from more 
complex ones backwards to the simpler ones” (Castelli et al., 2011). 
By contrast, Poletti and Bonuccelli (2013) recently reported an alteration of hot mentalizing 
in amnestic mild cognitive impairment subjects, as measured by the RME. This empirical evidence 
of a faulty affective ToM in individuals with high risk of developing probable AD is not consistent 
with previous findings (Castelli et al., 2011; Laisney et al., 2013) suggesting a lesser degree of 
impairment on the cognitive dimension than on the affective one. Therefore further studies on the 
topic are needed.  
Furthermore, the implication of the frontal lobe in ToM abilities led some authors to propose 
a relationship between executive dysfunctions and ToM deficits, especially since impairments of 
mental state inference was explained by more general difficulties (Poletti et al., 2012; Kemp et al., 
2012). 
In fact, some experimental evidences led to think that ToM performances could be 
correlated to more general cognitive decline. In normal aging, German and Hehman (2006), for 
example, showed that non-specific cognitive abilities, and especially on executive resources 
contributed most to explaining mental inference deficits. A recent review (Sandoz, Démonet, & 
Fossard, 2014) argued that general cognitive resources are involved in ToM performances on AD. 
In fact, these authors suggested that mentalizing abilities were relying on different executive 
components, especially inhibition process that totally mediated ToM scores, as well as flexibility 
and up-dating processes involved in ToM performances (see Sandoz et al., 2014 for a detailed 
review). 
Although many researches had documented executive dysfunctions in AD (Amieva, 
Phillips, Della Sala, & Henry, 2004; Allain, Etcharry-Bouyx, & Verny, 2013), the link between 
executive functions (EF) and ToM is not yet fully studied in AD patients by means of a theoretical 
approach of EF (Aboulafia-Brakha, Christe, Martory, & Annoni, 2011). In fact, to our knowledge, 
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only very few studies assessed correlations between ToM performances and EF. In one hand, 
studies by Zaitchik et al. (2004; 2006) showed that performances on ToM tests were significantly 
correlated with performances on WAIS Similarities subtest that assess abstraction ability. In the 
other hand, Laisney et al. (2013) found significant correlations only between FB2 inference and 
inhibition (Stroop test), shifting (phonemic verbal fluency), and working memory (backward digit 
span), suggesting that these dysfunctions contributed to the deterioration in the more complex 
aspects of cognitive ToM abilities. 
In sum, available literature on ToM abilities in AD remains controversial, for both cognitive 
and affective dimensions of ToM reasoning. The implication of non-specific cognitive abilities 
(especially EF) on these performances remains understudied in AD. These divergent data could be 
explained either (a) by the multiplicity of methodologies used in these studies, especially the 
complexity of some ToM tasks (Castelli et al., 2011), (b) by the heterogeneity of the AD patients 
included in terms of disease severity (Laisney et al., 2013), (c) or by the involvement of decreased 
general cognitive resources in AD on mentalizing abilities (Sandoz et al., 2014).  
Therefore, the original aim of the present study was to propose a ToM protocol assessing 
cognitive (FB task) and affective (RME test) subcomponents of ToM abilities in AD patients 
classified into two distinct groups according to the stage of AD (early versus modorate AD). In 
addition, this protocol includes a composite ToM task developed to asses ToM ability with minimal 
cognitive demands (judgment of preferences task). The second goal was to assess the implication of 
EF deficits on ToM performances in our two AD groups. For this purpose, EF was assessed 
according to the approach of Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, and Wager (2000). 
Our main research hypotheses were: (a) if ToM abilities are sensitive to general cognitive 
functioning, we can expect to observe significant differences between our two AD groups, with 
lower performances on all ToM tasks, regardless of the task complexity, in the group of patients 
having moderate AD. Correlations of ToM scores with general cognitive functioning indicator 
should also support this assumption; (b) we also expect to highlight a significant difference between 
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scores on well-documented ToM tasks and the composite ToM task with minimal cognitive 
demands in both AD patients groups. Higher correlations between global executive indicator and 
ToM scores of complex tasks should support this hypothesis; (c) Finally, we aimed at looking for 
the implication of executive disorders on faulty mentalizing abilities. Correlations between general 
cognitive resources and ToM scores will be assessed in order to discuss more specifically an 
integrated conception of ToM performances in AD groups. 
Methods 
Participants 
Forty-two French-speaking AD patients and 23 healthy older subjects (HO) took part in this 
study. In order to take into account progressive decay of ToM reasoning in the course of AD, we 
formed 2 subgroups of AD patients: moderate AD patients and early AD patients. Informed consent 
was obtained from all subjects, or from substitute decision-makers, in compliance with research 
standards for human research for participating institution, and in accordance with the Helsinki 
Declaration. 
AD patients 
 Moderate AD patients (mAD) 
 Nineteen patients suffering from mAD (14 females and 5 males; mean age: 79.3 years; mean 
years of education: 7.7 years) were included. For all subjects, diagnosis was made according to the 
international criteria of DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and fulfilling the 
recommendation of the National Institute on Aging (Albert et al., 2011; McKhann et al., 2011). 
Patient’s medical history, neurological examination, brain imaging, and laboratory tests provided 
assurance that dementia symptoms could not be attributed to an illness other than moderate AD. 
The level of global cognitive performance was based on the Mini Mental State Examination 
(MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975); mAD was considered when the MMSE score was 
between 18 and 22 (m = 19.8, SD = 1.4).  
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Early AD patients (eAD) 
The group of patients with eAD included 23 individuals (12 females and 11 males; mean 
age: 77.7 years; mean years of education: 9.2 years). All subjects fulfilled the same clinical criteria 
(Albert et al., 2011; McKhann et al., 2011; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) for probable 
AD. Patient’s medical history, neurological examination, brain imaging, and laboratory tests 
provided assurance that dementia symptoms could not be attributed to an illness other than early 
AD. MMSE scores were comprised between 23 and 27 (m = 24.3, SD = 1.2). 
Healthy Older subjects (HO)  
The 23 HE subjects consisted of 11 men and 12 women. Their mean age was 77.9 years (SD 
= 9.9; range: 45-91). Their educational level ranged from 6 to 13 years of schooling (m = 8.6; SD = 
2.1). The HO subjects had no history of neurological or psychiatric diseases, brain damage, or 
global cognitive deterioration as documented by the MMSE (m = 28.9; SD = 1; range: 27–30).  
Brief neuropsychological assessment 
As previously mentioned, global efficiency was evaluated using the MMSE. A short global 
executive functions assessment was also performed using the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB; 
Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000), which consists of 6 subtests exploring 
conceptualization, mental flexibility, motor programming, sensitivity to interference, inhibitory 
control, and environmental autonomy. It takes approximately 10 minutes to administer. 
Neuropsychological scores are presented in Table 1. These measures were selected because they 
have been shown to be the most commonly used cognitive screening tool of general cognitive 
functioning (MMSE) and executive functioning (FAB) in AD patients (Woodford & George, 2007). 
Executive functioning: 
In addition to a brief global assessment of executive functioning according to the FAB 
(Dubois et al., 2000), the main executive components were assessed on the basis of the study of 
Miyake et al. (2000), which made the distinction between the following elementary executive 
processes: “shifting” process, “inhibition” process, “updating” process, and evaluation of central 
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executive components of working memory. We investigated these functions by employing the 
following standard tests:  
Shifting process: the plus/minus test consisting of 3 lists of numbers. Participants had to add 
1 to each number (list 1), to subtract 1 (list 2), then to alternately add or subtract 1 to each presented 
number (list 3). Time necessary to complete this task, and errors number were taken into account. 
For the statistic analysis, we focused on the “errors shifting score” (average errors made on the 3rd 
list - average errors made on the 2 simple conditions). 
Inhibition process: the Stroop test was considered as a measure of inhibition of automatic 
responses. We were interested in the difference between uncorrected errors on the 3rd condition 
(interference condition) and errors made on the 1st condition (color denomination). 
Updating process: We used the 2-back test consisting of a list of orally presented 30 letters, 
at a rate of one letter per 2 seconds. Participants were asked to identify whether the last letter heard 
was identical to the last but one. The scores considered were the number of errors made. 
Central executive components of working memory: Complementary measures of the central 
executive system of working memory were obtained using the classic dual task. In the simple 
conditions, a digit-span task was presented to participants who had to immediately recall the series 
in the same order, and then the box-crossing task consisted of traversing a chain of squares with 
crosses. The dual condition task consisted of the simultaneous execution of both tasks and the 
performance was estimated by “mu” (Baddeley, Bressi, Della Sala, Logie, & Spinnler, 1991), a 
composite index that is supposed to reflect the subject's capacity to coordinate the separate tasks. 
ToM tasks 
All participants completed 3 non-verbal ToM tasks (Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, & 
Desgranges, 2011). Each one contained a ToM condition and a control condition, to fairly link poor 
performances on these tasks to difficulties in making mental inferences.  
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Cognitive ToM task: False-beliefs Task (FB) 
This task was a revised version of the Wimmer and Perner's FB (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
It assessed the ability to attribute 1st and 2nd order epistemic mental states to others. This task was 
thought to reflect solely the “cognitive” subcomponent of ToM, without an emotional involvement 
(Duval et al., 2011; Desgranges et al., 2012). It consisted of 15 short comic strips, each comprising 
3 pictures with a short written description. These comic strips assessed the ability to solve problems 
involving FB1 (8 situations) and FB2 (7 situations). The stories were everyday situations involving 
a character, which took knowledge of described information. The situation changed without her/his 
knowledge. We then asked questions about the expected reactions of the person carrying FB about 
his environment. There were two conditions. In the ToM condition, a question about the belief of 
one of the characters in the story was proposed. In the control condition, the same cartoons were 
used, but the question probed participants’ understanding of the reality of the cartoon scenario. For 
each question, only two answers were possible. In order to reduce working memory load, the 
pictures, the written descriptions, and the possible answers remained visible throughout the task. 
The percentages of correct responses in each condition were considered as dependent variables. 
Affective ToM task: The Eyes/Faces Test (EFT) 
The EFT was inspired by the RME test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It assessed 
understanding of other people’s mental states from their eyes. It consisted of 20 black-and-white 
photographs of the eye region of a female actor who was asked to produce different facial 
expressions. Ten of the photographs depicted primary emotions (happiness, surprise, etc.). Ten 
photographs depicted complex emotions (guilt, thoughtful, flirting, etc.). Under each picture, three 
adjectives (a target and two foils) describing emotions were written. Participants were asked to 
identify which adjective best described the person’s mental state. This task is thought to measure 
emotion recognition in the basic emotions condition (control condition) and affective ToM in the 
complex emotions one (ToM condition). The percentages of correct responses in each condition 
were used as dependent variables.   
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Composite ToM task: Preference Judgement Task: (PJ) 
The third task, inspired by Snowden et al. (2003), could be considered as a composite task 
because it involves the ability to judge the preference (or thoughts) of a central character, named 
Tom (referring to cognitive ToM), on the basis of its facial expression (pouting or smiling, referring 
to affective ToM). This task is supposed to engage minimal cognitive demands (Snowden et al., 
2003; Duval et al., 2011). We used it in order to test our hypothesis of the implication of task 
complexity on ToM performances in AD patients. 
The material consisted of 16 cards drawings on separate sheets, each showing a figure in a 
central position, either smiling or pouting, in order to express Tom’s preferences (affective ToM 
component). Tom's gaze was directed towards a balloon containing the picture of an object (e.g. 
biscuits), expressing his thoughts (cognitive ToM component) meaning, for example, that he likes 
biscuits. For each ToM situation, a short scenario with an ending question was orally presented to 
put it in a social context (e.g. ‘‘imagine that you have kindly invited Tom to your house for tea or 
coffee. What would you serve with the tea or coffee?’’). Then, the experimenter showed four 
possible response pictures, chosen for their degree of relevance: (1) correct response taking both 
Tom’s preference and the context into account (madeleines), (2) incorrect response only taking the 
context into account (chocolates), (3) incorrect response only taking Tom’s preference into account 
(salted crackers), and (4) unsuitable response taking neither Tom’s preference nor the context into 
account (oysters). Once the participant had answered, he was asked to justify his choice for each 
item. These answers were coded as “preference” if the participant took into account Tom’s 
preference in the correct context; “self” if he/she responded according to his/her own preference; 
“context” if he/she chose the response suitable only to the history context and “random” for other 
motivations. In a second condition (control condition), the same 16 Tom’s faces were presented, 
without social situations or possible responses. The participant was asked to interpret the facial 
expression of Tom to check the good understanding of facial cues. The dependent measure was the 
percentage of correct answers (according to both Tom’s preference and context) in the first (ToM) 
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condition. We also looked for the distribution of each type of erroneous response (preference, self, 
context, random).  
Statistical analysis 
All statistical analyses were performed using Statistica 10 (StatSoft, Inc., Tulsa, OK, USA). 
The threshold of significance was set at p = .05. Factorial ANOVA were carried out to compare the 
demographical and general neuropsychological data of the 3 groups. Factorial ANOVA were also 
conducted to analyze ToM and EF scores. Follow-up post-hoc comparisons were conducted with 
Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference tests. A chi-square test was used to test whether the AD 
patients had specific patterns of errors in the PJ task. Then, we carried out correlation analysis and 
stepwise regression analysis in order to determine the best ToM measure predictors. Regression 
analysis used the MMSE score, the FAB score, EF scores, the number of years of education, and 
age as independent factors, and ToM scores as dependent factors. 
Results 
Demographic characteristics and neuropsychological performances of AD patients and HO 
subjects are shown in Table 1. The 3 groups did not differ significantly in age (F(2,62) =.17; MSE = 
14.1), or educational level (F(2,62) =1.4; MSE = 11.6). Chi-square tests revealed that they were also 
matched with respect to sex (Chi-square = 2.56; df = 1; p = .27). 
__________________ 
Table 1 about here 
__________________ 
Complementary cognitive assessment 
Both AD groups performed below the normal range on short neuropsychological measures, 
suggesting diminished general cognitive functions and executive abilities. In fact, AD patients 
performed poorly as compared to control subjects on the MMSE (F(2,62) =307.4; MSE = 430.3; p < 
.0001). A group effect also emerged for the FAB (F(2,49) =23.3; MSE = 222.5; p < .0001). All 
post-hoc analyses reported significant differences between the 3 groups, with HO subjects 
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performing significantly better than eAD and mAD patients (both p < .0001). In addition, consistent 
with our methodological choices, eAD patients performed significantly better than mAD patients on 
MMSE (p < .0001) measure and on FAB score (p < .001).  
Executive performances: 
For the executive functions (Table 2), we reported a group effect on inhibition process 
(F(2,60) =3.6; MSE = 427.5; p = .03), and on shifting process (F(2,60) =9.4; MSE = 99.2; p = 
.0002). Post-hoc analyses indicated a significant difference between the mAD and the HO groups 
(Inhibition: p < .03; Shifting: p < .0002), and a non-significant difference between the eAD and the 
HO groups, which demonstrates the progressive deterioration of these processes in AD. The 
difference between the two AD groups was significant for the shifting process (p = .02) but not for 
the inhibitory process (p = .09).  
As far as up-dating process was concerned, we only noted a tendency to significance 
(F(2,60) =2.8; MSE = 47.3; p = .07). Finally, regarding the dual task, no difference was reported on 
“mu” score (t(30) = .7; p = .5) between our two AD groups.  
__________________ 
Table 2 about here 
__________________ 
ToM tasks 
FB task 
For the FB task (Table 3), data were submitted to a 3 x 3 ANOVA with group (mAD, eAD, 
HO) as the between-subjects factor, and FB task condition (control condition, FB1, FB2) as the 
within-subjects factor. The main effect of group was highly significant, F(2, 62) = 7.8; MSE = 
6640.3; p < .0001. Post hoc tests revealed that, all conditions combined, mAD patients (mean 
percentage of correct responses: 59.8% ± 30.5) performed significantly worse (p = .001) than HO 
subjects (mean: 79.4% ± 19.5), but equally (p = .56) to eAD patients (mean: 65.2% ± 24.8). The 
group difference between eAD patients and HO subjects was also significant (p = .02).  
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There was also a main effect of FB task condition, (F(2, 62) = 65.4; MSE = 16431.3; p < 
.0001). Independently of group, the proportion of correct answers was significantly higher in the 
control condition (mean 84.1% ± 16.1) than in the FB1 condition (mean: 68.2% ± 24) and the FB2 
condition (mean: 52.1% ± 27) (both p < .0001). In addition, the difference between the FB1 
condition and the FB2 condition also reached significance (p < .0001). 
The group × condition interaction was also significant (F(4, 62) = 2.9; MSE = 735.2; p = 
.02), indicating that the groups’ patterns of performance varied across conditions. Subsequent one-
way ANOVA computed for each group revealed that the mean proportion of correct answers 
differed significantly across condition (control condition, FB1, FB2) in all groups [mAD patients: 
F(2, 36) = 16.8; MSE = 6913.3; p < .0001; eAD patients: F(2, 44) = 43.6; MSE = 8511.5; p < .0001; 
HO subjects: F(2, 44) = 12.7; MSE = 2233.9; p < .0001]. As can be seen in Table 2, the percentage 
of correct responses in all groups was higher in the control condition than in the FB1 condition and 
the FB2 condition, and higher in the FB1 condition than the FB2 condition. In mAD patients, post 
hoc tests indicated that the difference of performance between the control condition and the two FB 
conditions was significant (both p < .004), but that the difference between FB1 and FB2 conditions 
did not reach significance (p = .07). On the other hand, eAD patients and HO subjects had similar 
patterns of performance, with significant difference between control condition and the FB1 
condition, and between the FB1 and the FB2 conditions (all p < .04). Additionally, one-way 
ANOVA computed for each type of percentage of correct responses revealed no significant 
difference between groups in the control condition, F(2, 62) = 2; MSE = 482.9, indicating that both 
AD groups were as good as HO subjects to answer comprehension questions. Conversely, between 
group differences were significant for FB1 (F(2, 62) = 5; MSE = 2558.2; p = .009) and FB2 (F(2, 
62) = 8.5; MSE = 5069.5; p = .0005). Concerning FB1, subsequent post hoc tests showed that mAD 
patients performed significantly worse than HO subjects (p = .007). No significant difference 
emerged between eAD patients and HO subjects (p = .21), or between our two AD groups (p = .27). 
Finally, post hoc analyses for FB2 showed that both groups of AD patients performed worse than 
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HO subjects (both p < .002), and that the difference in percentage of correct answers between the 
patients groups was marginal (p = .93).   
__________________ 
Table 3 about here 
__________________ 
EFT task 
Concerning affective ToM, the results for the EFT test showed no significant main effect of 
group, F(2, 51) = .7; MSE = 311.4. Nevertheless, a significant effect of condition was observed, 
F(3, 51) = 12.3; MSE = 2909.6; p < .0001, suggesting different performances in all groups between 
control and ToM conditions. No interaction group × condition, F(6, 153) = 1.4; MSE = 321.3 was 
found. 
PJ task 
Finally, the ANOVA conducted for PJ task revealed a significant main effect of group, F(2, 
61) = 12.2; MSE = 3127.4; p < .0001. Post hoc tests indicated that mAD patients performed 
significantly worse (mean 50.3% ± 16) than eAD patients (mean 55.4% ± 16) and HO subjects 
(mean 73.4% ± 16) on this task (both p’ < .0001). The difference between eAD patients and HO 
subjects was also significant (p = .001). 
Further analysis comparing the proportions of each type of errors in our groups was 
conducted with Chi square test. The proportions of error rates did not differ (p = .25) between the 
two AD groups (mAD patients: 17%, 52%, 27%, and 4% for “preference”, “context”, “self”, and 
“random”, respectively; eAD patients: 22%, 42%, 32%, and 4%, respectively). As shown in figure 
1, significant differences emerged between HO subjects (41%, 35%, 23%, and 1%, respectively) 
and mAD patients (p < .0001), and between HO subjects and eAD patients (p = .0001). 
__________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
__________________ 
To summarize, AD has deleterious effects on general ToM abilities. However, this effect 
mainly concerns cognitive and composite ToM performances, while affective ToM appears to be 
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spared. In the cognitive task, while the FB1 is spared in eAD patients, the FB2 is affected by both 
eAD and mAD. In the composite task, both groups of AD present faulty preference judgments, with 
a pattern of error that differs from HO subjects. Depending on the task, eAD patients differ either 
from mAD patients or from HO subjects, suggesting a progressive and non-unitary ToM ability 
decay. 
Relationship between ToM and general and executive functioning within 
the patients’ groups 
Correlation analyses 
To assess the links between EF and ToM tasks, simple correlation analyses were carried out. 
First analyses were conducted for the two AD groups together, then for each group independently. 
The results are detailed in Table 4.  
Results showed no significant correlations between ToM tasks and EF when they were 
assessed in the mAD group only (for all Pearson correlation coefficients p > .05).  
Second, in the eAD group, we pointed out significant correlations between up-dating and 
cognitive ToM [FB1 score (r = -.81; p = .004); FB2 task (r = -.65; p = .04)]. As affective ToM was 
concerned, a unique significant correlation was reported between the complex emotions-eyes score 
and Stroop interference score (r = -.63; p = .04). Composite ToM measure was also correlated to 
global FAB score (r = -.56; p = .004), and to shifting (r = -.81; p = .04). 
Finally, in the whole AD group, we showed very few negative significant correlations, on 
one hand between the FB1 and up-dating (r = -.54; p = .03), and on the other hand between the FB2 
score and shifting (r = -.54; p = .03). 
__________________ 
Table 4 about here 
__________________ 
Regression analyses 
To go one step further, we conducted a set of upward stepwise regression analyses to 
identify the best predictor(s) of intergroup differences in ToM performance in the whole AD group. 
We selected as predictors: age; educational level, MMSE, FAB, and executive measures. Results 
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are outlined in Table 5. They showed that performances on FB1 task were mainly predicted by up-
dating and MMSE scores. Educational level and FAB score were the best predictors of the FB2 
reasoning (proportion of variance R² = 57%) and of the affective ToM measures (proportion of 
variance R² = 43%).  
__________________ 
Table 5 about here 
__________________ 
To sum up, cognitive and affective ToM were both correlated to EF scores. Specifically, 
cognitive ToM was mainly related to up-dating and shifting process, whereas, affective ToM was 
correlated to inhibition. As far as composite ToM was concerned, few correlations were pointed 
out, except for shifting process. However, the relationship between ToM indicators and EF scores 
seems to be explained, at least partly, by demographic (age and educational level) and global 
cognitive data (MMSE and FAB).  
Discussion 
The main goal of the present study was to discuss the implication of task complexity and 
AD severity in performing cognitive and affective ToM tasks. For this purpose, we assessed two 
groups of AD patients at different stages of disease (moderate AD patients and early AD patients), 
and a matched control group of HO subjects using two classical tasks designed to explore cognitive 
(1st and 2nd False Beliefs task) and affective (Eyes/Faces Test) mental states attribution. We also 
included a third task appreciating both affective and cognitive ToM with minimal cognitive load 
(Preference Judgments task). Overall, we observed a progressive decrease of ToM abilities (except 
for affective task) regardless the complexity of tasks.  
First of all, as far as 1st order cognitive ToM is concerned, our findings throw more light 
upon this topic. To date, this study is the first to demonstrate a significant difference in ToM 
performance between two groups of AD patients at different stages of disease. Only mAD patients 
displayed difficulties in detecting FB1. Patients with eAD had equal performances to HO subjects 
but showed poorer global cognitive performances (as documented by the MMSE). This original 
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finding confirms that cognitive ToM abilities decrease progressively over the course of disease 
(Laisney et al., 2013). Regression analysis confirmed this assumption since we observed that up-
dating process and disease severity (MMSE score) were the best predictors of FB1 deficits.  
Regarding FB2 task, our results are in line with those of previous studies on AD (Gregory et 
al., 2002; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2011; Laisney et al., 2013; Freedman et al., 2013). In fact, 
regardless the disease severity, AD patients presented a faulty cognitive ToM ability. There was no 
more differences between both groups of AD patients.  
Interestingly, we showed that the best predictor of FB2 performance was the educational 
level. This indicator reflects premorbid cognitive resources. Indeed, in line with the assumption of 
Laisney et al. (2013), we observed a general effect of crystallized intelligence on cognitive ToM 
performance. Similar finding was also previously reported in healthy aging (Maylor, Moulson, 
Muncer, & Taylor, 2002), and in fv-FDT (Torrelva et al., 2009). This was never experimentally 
tested in AD patients until today.  
Our results are consistent with other current researches on ToM. They confirm the 
integrative conception of ToM performances in normal aging (German & Hehman, 2006), and in 
AD population as it was recently suggested (Sandoz et al., 2014). This assumption implies that 
ToM reasoning is relying on both cognitive resources (e.g. executive process) and mentalizing 
ability. Hence, decreased performances on ToM tasks could reflect, in part, a general cognitive 
decline. We can then speculate that our eAD patients had similar performances on ToM tasks as did 
subjects of the control group because of better cognitive resources that offset the decreasing 
mentalizing reasoning. These aspects of compensatory mechanisms could operate until cognitive 
resources become too reduced to deal with the complexity of FB2 tasks.  
In the FTD, Eslinger and his colleagues had already developed a neural model of social 
cognition; the social executors framework (Eslinger et al., 2007; Eslinger, Moore, Anderson, & 
Grossman, 2011). In this model, social breakdowns result from the interaction between social 
knowledge and executive resources (for more details see Eslinger et al., 2007). Accordingly, and 
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due to the fact that executive decline in AD appears later in the course of disease (Sandoz et al., 
2014), our results can be explained on the basis of compensatory mechanisms: cognitive ToM 
reasoning in early stages of AD continues to be efficient because of the alternative use of non-
specific executive resources.  
Second, with regard to affective ToM, results showed that both AD groups as well as control 
subjects had similar performances on the EFT. These findings are not entirely in accordance with 
the recent study of Laisney et al. (2013) who found, using the same methodology, an impairment of 
complex affective mental states understanding in AD. Moreover, unlike Laisney et al. (2013) we 
did not observe a correlation between EFT scores and the severity of dementia, but, a correlation 
between affective ToM and educational level and global FAB score was found. As these two 
indicators are reflecting global cognitive resources, we can suggest that AD patients are able to infer 
correct affective states to others thanks to a correct comprehension of the situation. Since decoding 
of facial emotions becomes impaired over the course of the disease due to the decline of general 
cognitive resources (see for example Klein-Koerkamp, Beaudoin, Baciu, & Hot, 2012), the 
affective ToM may decrease.  
In fact, this is consistent with the finding of Castelli et al. (2010) who submitted two healthy 
groups (young versus older) to an fMRI scanning while realizing the RME test. Although the 
authors did not report any difference in behavioral performances between the two groups, they 
showed differences in activated mentalizing circuits. In fact, if the youngest group activated the 
superior temporal sulcus and the temporal poles, old people showed a relevant bilateral activation of 
frontal areas and a stronger involvement of the linguistic components of the mirror neuron system, 
reflecting according to Castelli et al. (2010), compensatory mechanisms.  
In the current study, we did not perform neuroimaging studies so we could only speculate on 
a possible link between our divergent results and compensatory mechanisms on hot mentalizing. 
Further studies are needed to explore if activated circuits differ between AD patients showing 
frontal damages (Van Hoesen et al., 2000; Carrington & Bailey, 2009) and HO subjects. 
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Third, in order to test the implication of task severity, we included a composite ToM task 
(PJ task), with minimal cognitive demands, to test mental reasoning without involving more general 
cognitive aspects (Snowden et al., 2003; Duval et al., 2011; Laisney et al., 2013). Our results 
showed that both AD groups performed worse than HO subjects on the composite ToM task. These 
results are not consistent with the task complexity assumption. 
We also observed participants’ significant error patterns. Indeed, mAD and eAD patients 
produced more personal justifications (52% and 42%, respectively) than HO subjects (35%). HO 
subjects took into account Tom’s taste better than their own preference. Our result supports the 
proposition, made by Castelli et al. (2011) without experimental verification, that AD patients’ 
choices were driven by their own preferences. This pattern of justifications leads us to interpret 
personal taste salience as a compensatory mechanism. In fact, patients tend to rely on personal 
elements, which are always available, to cope with their failure to take into account others’ 
perspectives.  
The present results may also be interpreted in accordance with prior studies depicting faulty 
perspective taking in AD (Ruby et al., 2009; Freedman et al., 2013). In fact, the PJ test presents a 
conflict between two perspectives (own perspective vs. third-person perspective). Participants had 
to (a) inhibit their salient perspectiv s; (b) shift attentional focus on the third-person perspective; 
and (c) infer others’ perspectives (Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005; 
Samson, 2009). The extant data (Bora et al., 2015; Le Bouc et al., 2012) suggest that mentalizing 
disturbances in AD are the consequence of difficulty to infer beliefs to others (mainly subtended by 
a dysfunction of the temporo-parietal junction, see Le Bouc et al., 2012). This difficulty is distinct 
from ToM dysfunction in FTD associated with difficulty to inhibit their own perspective, which 
mainly depends on the lateral prefrontal cortex (see for a review Henry et al., 2015; Bora et al., 
2015).  
The second main aim of the present study was to examine the association between ToM 
performance and executive dysfunction in AD people.  
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We showed that while moderate AD patients were impaired on spontaneous flexibility 
(plus/minus test) and inhibition (Stroop), but not on up-dating (2-back) nor on allocation of 
attention in working memory (dual task) the early AD patients did not differ from HO group on any 
of these executive tasks. These results further support the idea of a progressive executive decline in 
AD patients (see for example Carter, Caine, Burns, Herholz, & Lambon Ralph, 2012). 
The progressive decay of both ToM ability and executive functioning in AD patients at 
different stages of disease, allows us to consider EF as a “scaffold” (Apperly, Samson, Humphreys, 
2009) to a successful ToM reasoning. When EF deficits appear, the ability to interpret mental state 
decreases, reflecting individual discrepancy to deal with brain damages and cognitive demands of 
mentalizing tasks. These results are consistent with the idea that ToM performances result from an 
integrative reasoning: specialized mentalizing abilities and non-specific resources such as executive 
selection (Sandoz et al., 2014). As it was demonstrated in normal aging (German & Hehman, 2006), 
faulty ToM performances in our patients were, in part, linked to a decline in executive selection 
abilities due to AD. 
As reported by Stern (2009; 2012), we hypothesized that compensatory mechanisms could 
allow functional social interacting in AD patients, even if some ToM performances were declined. 
These mechanisms could be called “social reserve”. On the basis of the same principle of cognitive 
reserve (individual differences to tolerate, over at least, brain changes and still maintain functional 
cognitive performance, Stern, 2012), premorbid cognitive level, as well as global resources, can act 
as moderators between pathological lesions in AD and social outcome. Social reserve can be 
defined as the ability of early AD patients to maintain efficient mentalizing reasoning relying on 
spared cognitive general resources. This reserve allows AD patients to adapt their social behaviors 
in real interactions, despite poorer ToM scores. So, individuals with high social reserve would 
better cope with brain dysfunction due to higher general cognitive recourses. When, cognitive 
deficits reach a critical threshold, social symptoms will start to appear. 
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However, in the current study, caution is needed as regard the assumption of the alternative 
hypothesis of social reserve due to the lack of neuroimaging data to confirm behavioral data 
(Carrington & Bailey, 2009) as well as the absence of functional indicators of real behavioral 
disturbances. In addition, we did not use clinical scales (as Clinical Dementia Rating Scale) for 
staging AD and our neuropsychological protocol would have to include more cognitive processes 
influencing ToM in AD (Sandoz et al., 2014). For instance, measures of vocabulary level, logical 
reasoning, and episodic memory were not considered in this paper. In line with the social reserve 
hypothesis, further studies are needed for (a) examining the performance of amnestic mild cognitive 
impaired patients, considered as a pre-clinical condition (see for example Moreau et al., 2015); and 
(b) testing AD patients in situation of real interaction to assess the use of social knowledge in 
dynamic interaction.  
In conclusion, and notwithstanding these limitations, the current study provides the first 
empirical evidence of a progressive decay of cognitive ToM abilities in AD. Cognitive ToM seems 
to be spared in the early stage of AD. Disorganized behaviors and breakdown in everyday life 
relationships appear when the social reserve is exhausted. These findings need further empirical and 
neuroimaging confirmations. This original neuropsychological study also suggests the importance 
to include ToM evaluation in neuropsychological assessments (Adenzato & Poletti, 2013) in order 
to better understand behavioral changes in real interpersonal interactions (Hodges, 2013).  
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Table 1. Neuropsychological and demographic data of the study population.  
 
mAD 
patients  eAD patients   
HO  
subjects  ANOVA  
p-value 
 
Tukey HSD post-hoc test 
 (n = 19)  (n = 23)  (n = 23)  
eAD/mAD HO/mAD HO/eAD 
 mean  SD  mean  SD  mean SD  
Age 79.3 9.9  77.7 7  77.9 9.9  ns  ns ns ns 
Sex-ratio (M/F) 5/14  11/12  11/12          ns* -  
Education level 7.7 2.6  9.2 3.7  8.6 2.1  ns  ns ns ns 
MMSE 19.8 1.4  24.3 1.2  28.9 1  < .0001  .0001 .0001 .0001 
FAB 9.5 4.2  13.2 2.7  17.5 0.5  < .0001  .001 .001 .0001 
note: SD= Standard Deviation; HO= Healthy Older subjects; eAD= early Alzheimer's Disease patients, mAD= moderate Alzheimer's Disease patients; M= male; 
F= female;  
MMSE = Mini Mental Sate Examination (Folstein et al., 1975) ; FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois et al., 2000). 
*Chi square 
significant results p < . 05 
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Table 2. Performances of the groups of AD patients and HO subjects on executive tasks. 
 mAD  eAD   HO  
ANOVA 
F(p) 
Tukey HSD post-hoc test 
 
Effect 
size η² 
 (n = 19)  (n = 23)  (n = 23)   
 mean  SD  mean  SD  mean SD   
Stroop interference 10.2 19.6 2.9 3.2  1.5 3.6  3.6 (.03) mAD<HO ; HO = eAD  .11 
Plus/Minus Shifting 5.2 4.5 2.5 3.1  0.8 1.8  9.4 (<.0000) 
mAD<HO ; HO = eAD ; 
mAD<eAD  .23 
2-back up-dating 11.1 4.1 8.7 3.7  7 4.4  2.8 (ns) -  .12 
“Mu” 90.5 14.2 86.5 18  -  .7 (ns) * -  .007 
note: SD= Standard Deviation; HO= Healthy Older subjects; eAD= early Alzheimer's Disease patients, mAD= moderate Alzheimer's Disease patients  
* t student   
significant results p < .05 
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Table 3. Performances of the groups of AD patients and HO subjects on ToM tasks. 
mAD  
patients  
eAD  
patients 
HO 
subjects 
ANOVA      
F(p) 
Tukey HSD 
 post-hoc test 
Effect 
size η² 
 (n = 19)  (n = 23) (n = 23) 
 
mea
n  
SD 
 
mea
n  
SD 
mea
n  
SD 
Cognitive ToM          
1st order FB 
57.3 28 
 67.9 
22.
2 79.3 
17.
5 
5 (.009) 
mAD<HO ; HO = 
eAD 
.14 
2nd order FB 
42.1 
28.
8 
 44.7 
20.
8 
69.6 
23.
7 
8.5 (.0005) mAD<eAD<HO .22 
Control FB  
80 
22.
4 
 82.9 
14.
2 
89.3 10 2 (ns) mAD = eAD = HO .05 
Affective ToM          
ToM condition  
45.7 
18.
3 
 54.4 
16.
5 
48.2 
21.
1 
.4 (ns) 
- 
.01 
Control condition  
55 
18.
7 
 55.3 
20.
4 
64.3 
13.
4 
.2 (ns) .02 
Composite ToM          
Judgment of 
preferences  
50.3 16  55.4 
16.
1 
73.4 
15.
9 
12.9 
(< .0001) 
mAD<eAD<HO .29 
note: SD= Standard Deviation; HO= Healthy Older subjects; eAD= early Alzheimer's Disease patients, mAD= moderate Alzheimer's 
Disease patients  
significant results p < .05  
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Table 4. Main correlations (Pearson correlation coefficient) between ToM scores and EF in the 
groups of AD patients  
 
FAB 
 Inhibition 
Stroop 
Shifting 
Plus/Minus 
 Up-dating 
2-back 
 Dual Task 
Composite score “mu”  
ToM Cognitive         
1st order FB task 
.37  .15 .03  -.48  .21  
.12 
-.26 
 .11 
-.31 
-.08 
-.03 
 -.54*  
 -.81* 
 -.05 
-.31  
2nd order FB task 
.33  .22 -.19  .10  .19  
.28 
.17 
 .09 
.10 
-.54* 
-.29 
 -.29 
 -.65* 
 -.09 
-.28  
ToM Affective         
 .21  .39 .36  -.29  .21  
Complex Emotions-Eyes 
.30 
.41 
 .10 
-.63* 
.18  
.21 
 .02 
-.06 
 -.27 
-.29  
ToM Composite         
 -.31  .03 -.31  -.41  .09  
Preference Judgments task 
-.31 
-.82* 
 .03 
.01  
-.31 
-.56* 
 -.41 
-.47 
 .09 
.006  
note: FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois et al., 2000) ;  
1st line = correlations on the mAD group only; 2sd line = correlations on the eAD group only; and the 3rd line =  
correlations on the whole AD group.  
*significant results p < .05  
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Table 5. Stepwise regression analyses with ToM dependent variables correlated with EF scores. 
EF related ToM dependent variable Steps and predictors β* p R² F p 
1st order FB task 
1. Up-dating - .71* .002* 
.63* 3.9 .02* 
2. Inhibition ns ns 
3. MMSE -.53* .04* 
4. FAB ns ns 
5. Shifting ns ns 
6. Educational level ns ns 
2nd order FB task 
1. Educational level  .47* .02* 
.57* 3.1 .04* 
2. FAB .55* .03* 
3. MMSE ns ns 
4.Up-dating ns ns 
5. Inhibition ns ns 
6. Shifting  ns ns 
Complex Emotions-Eyes 
1. Educational level  .53* .02* 
.43* 2.9 .05* 
2. FAB .60* .02* 
3. MMSE ns ns 
4.Ihibition ns ns 
PJ task 1. Educational level ns ns .12 2.5 ns 
note: MMSE = Mini Mental Sate Examination (Folstein et al., 1975) ; FAB = Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois et al., 2000)  
* significant results p < .05  
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
eb
ras
ka
, L
inc
oln
] a
t 0
0:5
0 0
3 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Theory of Mind and social reserve    Social Neuroscience   Page 37 of 37 
Figure 1. Proportion of error rates across error types in the groups of AD patients and HO subjects 
on PJ task. 
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